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LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE: THE
NEED FOR A UNIFORM APPROACH TO
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The canon of statutory construction utilized by courts to
determine the extraterritorial reach of legislation, commonly
referred to as the "Foley Doctrine,"' dictates that "unless a
contrary intent appears" all legislation will be presumed to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.2 The Supreme Court developed this presumption
against extraterritoriality presumably to inject both
consistency and predictability3 into the "art"4 of statutory
interpretation. However, the history of the judiciary's
application of the Foley Doctrine reveals that it has not
resulted in any degree of certainty, but has instead led to a
double standard. The geographic reach of laws regulating the
protection of the environment or relating to social issues has,
with rare exception, been consistently limited by the strict
application of the presumption, creating an almost
insurmountable barrier to extraterritorial application, even
where statutes were replete with suggestions of a broader
reach.5  In sharp contrast, and despite the judiciary's
1. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
2. Id- at 285.
3. The Honorable Richard A. Posner in his article, Statutory Interpretation:
In the Classroom and In the Court Room, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983), presents
various justifications that have been advanced for upholding canons of statutory
construction, but ultimately concludes that the use of canons of construction leads
to inconsistent results and should be replaced by his theory of imaginative
reconstruction.
4. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 570 (1988).
5. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S.
244 (1991) (Title VII was held not to apply extraterritorially to regulate
employment practices of United States employers who employ United States
citizens abroad.); DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.
1986) (The Age Discrimination Employment Act did not provide -protection for an
employee in Canada.); Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir.
1985) (The Age Discrimination Employment Act had no extraterritorial reach to
protect an employee who had been employed by a United States corporation in
Germany.); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
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recognition that Congress was silent with regard to
international applicability, the Foley Doctrine has not
prevented the extraterritorial application of antitrust,
securities, and trademark statutes.'
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,7 the Supreme Court had
the opportunity to explain, clarify, or eliminate the
inconsistent utilization of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, but did not do so. The plaintiff, Defenders of
Wildlife, challenged an administrative rule change
promulgated by the Department of the Interior in 1986,8
which exempted federal agencies from compliance with section
647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (The National Environmental Policy Act did not
apply to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's approval of the export of a nuclear
reactor to the Philippines.); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977)
(The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 did not apply to a United States
citizen who captured dolphins, under the color of Bahamian law, while in the
coastal waters of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.); Greenpeace USA v. Stone,
748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990) (The National Environmental Policy Act did not
apply to the Army's transportation of chemical munitions from the Federal
Republic of Germany to an island in the Pacific.); see also Jonathan Turley, "When
in Rome"." Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598 (1990) [hereinafter Turley, "When in
Rome"]; Jonathan Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the Economics of
Extraterritorial Regulation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 339 (1990) [hereinafter Turley,
Transnational].
6. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (The Sherman
Antitrust Act was held to apply against United States companies who were
monopolizing Mexican sisal exports.); Reebok Int'l v. Marnatech Enter., 970 F.2d
552 (9th Cir. 1992); Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir.
1983) ("Trading activities on United States commodities markets... without
which the [plaintiffs] losses could not have occurred" was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction in the United States.); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. &
S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (United States had jurisdiction to adjudicate
monopolistic activities consummated in Honduras.); Schoenbaurn v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (A United States
company's sales of treasury stock below its true value in Canada violated the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952)
(The Trademark Act of 1946 was held to apply against trademark infringement
consummated in a foreign country by a citizen and resident of the United States.);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (The Sherman
Antitrust Act applied extraterritorially over Alcoa's monopolization of aluminum
ingot abroad.). See also Turley, "When In Rome," supra note 5; James R. Doty,
Developments in International Securities Law Litigation and Technical Assistance
To Emerging Securities Markets, C700 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 125 (1991); John H. Shenefield,
Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 52
FORDHAM L. REV..350 (1983).
7. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
8. 50 C.F.R. § .402.01(a) (1987).
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7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)9 when agencies funded
projects abroad. Section 7 of the ESA requires interagency
consultation where a contemplated action could impact an
endangered species.' ° As originally implemented, consultation
was mandated without regard to whether the federal action
contemplated was to occur inside or outside the territorial
borders of the United States." In 1986 the Secretary of the
Interior changed that policy and excluded consultation if the
activities contemplated were to occur within a foreign
jurisdiction.12
When presented with the Defenders of Wildlife's challenge
to the rule change, the Eighth Circuit, viewing the statute in
its entirety, found the Department of Interior's modification of
the geographic scope of section 7 to be contrary to a clear
"congressional commitment to worldwide conservation
efforts."'3 However, the Supreme Court, without discussing
the merits, reversed on procedural grounds, dismissing the
plaintiffs' claim on the basis of their lack of standing.'4
Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens's concurring opinion
concluded that the plaintiff had standing and accordingly he
addressed the extraterritorial issue.'5 Applying a highly
restrictive interpretation of the doctrine, Justice Stevens
rejected the Eighth Circuit's analysis of congressional intent
and espoused the view that the Foley Doctrine is to be applied
not to the facts as a whole, but rather to the particular section
within the statute. Analyzing the geographic scope of section 7
of the ESA under this interpretation, Justice Stevens was able
to justify the exclusion of agency activities in foreign
countries. 6
This Comment examines the interpretive uncertainty and
judicial discrimination which has developed in cases where the
international application of a statute is raised and proposes a
possible resolution. To demonstrate how Foley does not provide
a level of predictable interpretive results, this Comment traces
9. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
10. Id. § 1536(a).
11. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1987).
12. Id. § 402.01(a).
13. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir. 1990).
14. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
15. Id at 2147 (Stevens, J., concurring).
16. Id
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the legislative history of the ESA, and how the same history
can be used to support directly opposite conclusions. Against
this backdrop this Comment compares and contrasts the
judiciary's historical analysis of the issue of extraterritoriality
where social action legislation, typified by environmental
statutes, is under review, and where commercial legislation,
exemplified by the Trademark Act of 194617 (sometimes
referred to as the Lanham Act), is under review. This
examination strongly suggests that different criteria are
applied depending upon the type of legislation involved despite
there being no logical, theoretical, or policy justification for the
selective application of Foley. The analysis suggests that if the
courts implemented the same standards of extraterritorial
review regardless of the type or subject matter of the statute in
question, the results would be equally as predictable and the
legislative intent more accurately effectuated.
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR'S CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT
A Background and Intent
From the time of President Theodore Roosevelt's
administration, federal legislation has existed to protect wild
animals and birds, but those earlier enacted laws were either
specifically directed or narrowly tailored.'" Congress's
attempts to broaden these statutes in the 1960s' 9 were
deemed inadequate to protect the ever-dwindling number of
species throughout the world, and in 1973, President Nixon
signed into law20 a comprehensive statute known as the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA).Y
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
18. For example, the Lacey Act, originally passed in 1900, made it unlawful
for "any person . . . to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase
in interstate or foreign commerce" any wild animal or bird "taken" in violation of
any state or foreign law. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (1988). See also Mary A.
McDougall, Comment, Extraterritoriality and The Endangered Species Act of 1973,
80 GEO. L.J. 435 (1991).
19. Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-699, §§ 1-3,
80 Stat. 926 (repealed 1973); Endangered -Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (repealed 1973).
20. See Brad Knickerbocker, Biodiversity: Top Concern In Saving Species,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 23, 1991, at 9.
21. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
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The Act states its purpose broadly:
[Tihe United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in
the international community to conserve to the extent
practicable the various species of fish or wildlife and plants
facing extinction .... The purposes of this chapter are to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such
endangered species and threatened species . *...22
To insure that this far reaching objective is carried out,
the Act establishes specific criteria for identifying species as
either "threatened" or "endangered,"23 imposes both affirma-
tive and negative obligations upon federal agency action,24
and restricts private action that might result in the "taking"
25
of species listed on the endangered species list.
I The controversy in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife26 relat-
ed to obligations placed upon all federal agencies under section
22. Id. §§ 1531(a)(4)-1531(b).
23. The ESA defines "endangered species" as those "in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant part of its range," and "threatened species" as those
likely to become endangered in the near future. Id. §§ 1532(6), (20).
To gain ESA protection a species must be placed on the Endangered Spe-
cies List. Section 4 of the Act requires that the Secretary of Interior be responsi-
ble for listing all terrestrial species, while marine species are placed under the
auspices of the Secretary of Commerce. (For the purposes of this article the "Sec-
retary" will be used to refer to both offices.) In addition to delegating responsi-
bility, section 4 also establishes factors that the Secretary should use to determine
whether or not to list a particular species. These are: "(A) the present or threat-
ened destruction, modification or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B)
overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C)
disease or predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or, (E)
other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence." Id. §
1533(a)(i).
For a more detailed discussion of the listing process see James C.
Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under a Microscope: A Closeup Look From
a Litigator's Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499 (1991) [hereinafter Endangered Species
Act Under a Microscope]; M. Lynne Corn & Pamela Baldwin, Endangered Species
Act: The Listing and Exemption Process, CONG. RES. SERVICE REPORT FOR CON-
GRESS, May 8, 1990 at 1 [hereinafter The Listing and Exemption Process]; see also
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11-17.12 (1991).
24. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
25. The ESA defines the term "take" to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such con-
duct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19); see also Endangered Species Act Under a Microscope,
supra note 23.
26. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
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7(a)(2) of the ESA." To facilitate compliance with the overall
purpose of section 7(a)(2)-to protect listed species from the
adverse effects of federal agency action 2 -Congress included
substantive and procedural obligations in the statute.
Substantively, federal agencies are required to "insure that
any action" they authorize, fund, or carry out will not "jeopar-
dize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modi-
fication of [critical] habitat of such species. " 2' This mandate
has proven to be a powerful weapon against species extinction.
For example, the Supreme Court, in the highly publicized Ten-
nessee Valley Authority v. Hill,3 ° held that because the opera-
tion of the nearly completed multimillion dollar Tellico dam
would either eradicate the only known population of the en-
dangered Snail Darter or destroy the animal's critical habitat,
section 7 prohibited completion of the dam. The Court noted
that the ESA's stated policies, and indeed every section of the
statute, indicated that "the plain intent of Congress in enact-
ing this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward spe-
cies extinction, whatever the cost."3
In response to Hill, Congress, in 1978, amended the ESA
to permit exemption in certain circumstances." Under this
amendment any federal agency action presenting an
"irresolvable conflict"33 with section 7 may apply to the En-
dangered Species Committee34 for relief from the obligations
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
28. Id. The list is not restricted to species found within the borders of the
United States. Indeed, species found only within the United States compose only a
small number of all the species listed. See infra text accompanying note 66.
29. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1036 (8th Cir. 1988) (quot-
ing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988)).
30. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
31. Id at 155.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (1988).
33. Id. § 1536(g)(3).
34. The 1978 amendment created the Endangered Species Committee, which is
composed of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary
of the Interior, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administra-
tor of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Administrator of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and one individual from the affected
state. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (1988). See also The Listing and Exemption Process,
supra note 23, at 7.
Empowered with the authority to override the obligations imposed by the
ESA the Endangered Species Committee has been dubbed the "God Squad." In
1992, the now former Secretary of the Interior, Manuel Lujan, convened the "God
[Vol. XIX:31014
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imposed by the ESA. To grant an exemption the Committee
must conclude, based upon the evidence that:
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
agency action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of
alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the
species or its critical habitat, and such action is in the public
interest;
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and
(iv) neither the federal agency concerned nor the exemption
applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment
of resources prohibited by subsection (d) of this section."
If an exemption is granted, the Endangered Species Committee
must establish reasonable mitigation measures to minimize
the adverse effects of the agency action. 6
B. The Required Consultation Procedures
To ensure that ESA's substantive obligations are woven
into the fabric of the Federal government's decision-making
process, Congress specifically incorporated a consultation pro-
cedure in the legislation. Designed to "supply advice and infor-
mation,"37 section 7(a)(2) requires that all agencies consult
with the appropriate secretary38 to ensure that the agency
action39 will not "jeopardize or adversely modify critical habi-
Squad" to review whether the Bureau of Land Management should be permitted to
sell federal land, including the habitat of the endangered Northern Spotted Owl, to
logging companies. This highly controversial issue has been hotly debated, and is
beyond the scope of this article. The focus of the debate is whether the ESA
should be amended to include economic factors in determining which species to
protect. Margaret E. Kriz, Jobs v. Owls, NAT'L J., Nov. 30, 1991, at 2913-16. See
also M. Lynne Corn, Endangered Species Act Issues, CONG. RES. SERVICE ISSUE
BRIEF, July 27, 1992 [hereinafter Endangered Species].
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (1988).
36. Id. § 1536(1(1); see also The Listing and Exemption Process, supra note
23.
37. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir. 1988).
38. For species under the auspices of the Department of the Interior the con-
sultation agency is the Office of the Endangered Species of the United States Fish
-and Wildlife Service. For the marine species under the auspices of the Secretary of
Commerce the consultation agency is the National Marine Fisheries Service. 50
C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (1993).
39. The Department of the Interior has defined agency action to "mean all
activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or
1015.1993]
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tat."" The consultation requirement requires that specific
steps be taken in all cases to ascertain the potential effect of a
proposed agency action on endangered species. Once an agency
has informed the secretary of its proposed action, the secretary
is required to issue a written opinion detailing the project's
effect on listed species, including any suggestions of possible
alternative actions.4' As the Eighth Circuit noted in Defend-
ers of Wildlife v. Hodel,42 because the ultimate decision to can-
cel, alter, or proceed with a planned action rests solely with
the agency itself, "section 7 does not give the Department of
Interior (or the Department of Commerce) a veto over the ac-
tions of other federal agencies, provided that the required
consultation has occurred."43 However, the views of the depart-
ment could be invaluable in later litigation, where the key
issue is often whether an agency acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner or in accordance with the law.'
Despite the Supreme Court's declaration in Hill45 that
"one would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose
terms were any plainer,"46 and that the language of the ESA
admits of no exception,"47 the controversy in Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife4" arose out of the Secretary of the Interior's
promulgation of a regulation that effectively exempted all fed-
eral agencies from the interagency consultation obligation
whenever an agency is funding projects abroad.49 The final
in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the high seas." 50
C.F.R. § 402.02 (1993).
40. Endangered Species Act Under a Microscope, supra note 23, at 526 (de-
scribing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1988)).
41. 16 U.S.C § 1536(b)(3)(A) (1988).
42. 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988).
43. Id at 1037 (quoting National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359,
371 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976)); see also Sierra Club v.
Froehlk, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303 (8th Cir. 1976).
44. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). See also Endangered Species Act Under A Microscope,
supra note 23, at 534.
45. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
46. Id. at 173.
47. Id.
48. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
49. The 1986 regulation provides that "Section 7(a)(2) of the Act requires
every Federal agency, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secre-
tary, to insure that any action it authorizes, funds, or carries but, in the United
States or upon the high seas, is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any listed species." 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
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rule, which was "engineered by the Reagan administration," °
and, supported by the Bush administration,5' provides that
federal agencies are under a statutory duty to consult with the
Secretary only when they authorize, fund, or carry out projects
"in the United States and on the high seas.'52 This change in
the rule modified the Secretary's original interpretation of sec-
tion 7, which had included a consultation requirement for
agency action in foreign countries.53 Despite the presence of
specific references to international application in other sections
of the ESA' and the absence of a general restriction on the
geographic scope of section 7, the Secretary contended that this
policy modification was a reasonable interpretation of the ex-
traterritorial reach of the interagency consultation re-
quirement. He based this view on the "apparent domestic ori-
entation of the consultation and exemption processes resulting
from the [1978] Amendments, and ... the potential for inter-
ference with the sovereignty of foreign nations."55 Not surpris-
ingly, a challenge to the interpretation was mounted by con-
cerned environmentalists.
III. LUJAN V. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE
Claiming that the Secretary's recision of the international
scope of the interagency consultation requirement violated
section 7 of the ESA, Defenders of Wildlife filed suit in the
Federal District Court for the District of Minnesota.56 The
district court granted Secretary Lujan's motion to dismiss,
finding that the allegations were insufficient to constitute a
redressable "injury in fact," and, therefore, that Defenders of
Wildlife failed to satisfy the standing requirement set forth in
50. David G. Savage, Court Upholds Bush Wildlife Policy Limits, L.A. TIMES,
June 13, 1992, at Al.
51. Id.
52. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a) (1987).
53. The former regulation required "every Federal agency to insure that its
activities and programs in the United States, upon the high seas, and in foreign
countries will not jeopardize the continued existence of any listed species." 50
C.F.R. § 402.04 (1987) (emphasis added).
54. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
55. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct.
2130 (1992) (No. 90-1424) (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 19,929) (1986).
56. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987).
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Article III, section 2 of the Constitution. 7
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded.5"
The appellate court held that Congress, by expressly including
a provision that allows "any person"59 to commence a suit to
enjoin any action that allegedly violates ESA, eliminated any
prudential or policy limitations on the plaintiffs right to bring
a claim.6" In addition, the court of appeals was satisfied that
the evidence supported the Defenders of Wildlife's position that
it had suffered an "injury in fact" that was "fairly traceable
and likely to be redressed" by an action against the Secretary.
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit overruled the district court's
"case and controversy" concerns and remanded the action to
the district court to consider the merits of the plaintiffs
claim.61 Presented with the case for a second time, the dis-
trict court granted the Defenders of Wildlife's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of the extraterritorial reach of the
ESA.62 Specifically, the district court held that Congress in-
tended section 7's consultation requirements to apply to federal
actions both in the United States and in foreign countries."
57. Id.
58. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
60. Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1039.
61. Id. at 1039-43.
62. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989).
63. Id. at 1086. The court's judgment was as follows:
IT IS ORDERED That:
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied;
2. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted; and
3. The Clerk shall enter judgment as follows:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED That the Secretary of
the Interior shall:
1. Revoke and rescind so much of 50 C.F.R. Part 402 (1987) as limits
the consultation requirement of section 7 of the Endangered Species Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1536, to federal agency action that may affect endangered or
threatened species in the United States or on the high seas;
2. Publish within thirty (30) days of the lifting of any stay of execution
of this judgment, propose regulations clearly recognizing the full mandate
of section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, expressly and affirmatively
requiring that each federal agency consult with the defendant Secretary
with respect to any agency action that may effect any endangered or
threatened species, wherever found;
3. Publish within sixty (60) days of the lifting of any stay of execution of
this judgment, final regulations clearly recognizing the full mandate of
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, expressly and affirmatively
requiring that each federal agency consult with the defendant Secretary
1018
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The court explained that "Congress's concern with the interna-
tional aspects of the endangered species problem is unmistak-
able, marked by repeated appearances throughout the stat-
ute."
The court pointed out that congressional intent could be
gleaned from the statute as a whole with emphasis upon sec-
tions which directly address the international scope of ESA.
For example, section 1533 requires that the Secretary create a
list of all species that are either endangered or threatened, and
dictates that one of the factors the Secretary must take into
account in determining which species to list is action by for-
eign countries.6" In fact, as of January 31, 1992, of the 1,209
plants and animals listed, 528 had habitats outside the territo-
ry of the United States.66
Many other sections of ESA either expressly or implicitly
relate to international applicability. For example, section
1531(a)(4), which enacts various international environmental
treaties, states that "the United States has pledged itself as a
sovereign state in the international community to conserve to
the extent practicable" species of fish and wildlife throughout
the world;67 section 1532(6) defines the term "endangered spe-
cies" without any reference or limitations to specific geographic
regions;68 section 1537, titled International Cooperation, dic-
tates that, "as a demonstration of the commitment of the Unit-
ed States to the worldwide protection of endangered species"
the President may provide foreign countries with assistance in
the development and management of conservation pro-
grams;' 9 and section 1538 prohibits trade in any species listed
pursuant to section 1533.70 In addition to analyzing the statu-
te's plain language, the district court also found that the legis-
lative history of the 1978 amendments was consistent with,
with respect to any agency action that may affect any endangered or
threatened species, wherever found . ...
Id
64. Id. at 1085.
65. Id. (construing 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988)).
66. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12 (1991); see also Endangered Species, supra note
34, at 2.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (1988).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1988).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1988).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1988).
10191993]
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and supportive of, its conclusions.7'
The Eighth Circuit affirmed.72 Citing Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Def. Council,73 the court of appeals began
its analysis by posing two questions that courts are confronted
with when reviewing an agency's construction of a statute. The
first is whether Congress's intentions are clearly set forth in
the act,74 for if they are, both the court and the agency are
bound by this "unambiguously expressed"7 5 intent. However,
if the statute does not specifically speak to a particular issue,
the second question confronting the court is whether the
agency's interpretation is "based on a permissible construction
of the statute"76-- with the proviso that unless a contrary in-
tent appears, all laws are presumed to only apply within the
territorial borders of the United States.77
After examining the language of section 7(a)(2), the Eighth
Circuit concluded that the exemption for foreign activities was
not warranted because the section requires each federal agency
to consult with the Secretary regarding "any action" that is
likely to jeopardize endangered species.78 The court of appeals
acknowledged that the use of broad, all-inclusive "any action"
language, without more, was insufficient in itself to overcome
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 79 The court then
proceeded to look at the legislation as a whole and review
other sections of the Act to find a "clear expression of congres-
sional intent." ° As did the district court, the Eighth Circuit
found international concern apparent throughout the entire
statute.81 The appellate court concluded "that the Act viewed
as a whole, clearly demonstrates congressional commitment to
worldwide conservation efforts. To limit the consultation duty
in a manner which protects only domestic species runs con-
trary to such a commitment." 2 Therefore, because the "plain
71. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 (D. Minn. 1989).
72. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
73. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
74. Lujan, 911 F.2d at 122.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 125.
78. Id. at 122.
79. Id. (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 123.
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language"' of the Act clearly expresses Congress's intent, the
secretary's interpretation limiting agency consultation to the
domestic sphere was an invalid construction of section7(a)(2). 4
The Eighth Circuit also found that the legislative history
of the Act reinforced its conclusions.8 5 Prior to the 1978
amendment, the conference committee adopted provisions that
essentially restated the original section 7, but added the ex-
emption process and outlined the responsibilities of federal
agencies with regard to endangered species. 6 The committee
found that retaining existing law was preferable to change,
since regulations governing section 7 were familiar to most
federal agencies.8 7 Therefore, the court reasoned, Congress
passed the 1978 amendments presuming that an international
consultation requirement was part of existing law.' Thus, it
followed logically that Congress must have intended the inter-
national scope of the consultation obligation to remain in ef-
fect.89
Dissatisfied with the Eighth Circuit's holding, Secretary
Lujan sought review by the Supreme Court. Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, did not discuss the merits and dis-
missed the Defenders of Wildlife's claim, holding that the
plaintiffs failed to "assert sufficiently imminent injury to have
standing and plaintiffs claimed injury was not redressable. 9 °
The only Justice to address the merits of the controversy was
Justice Stevens, who concurred with the result reached by the
majority but not with its reasoning. Justice Stevens found that
the plaintiff did have standing, but would have reversed the
Eighth Circuit's holding on the issues of the international
application of section 7(a).9' Using formalistic reasoning, Jus-
tice Stevens utilized thfe many references to the international
implications in other sections of the ESA and pointed to section
7's silence on the issue to argue that section 7 failed to meet
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id at 124.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
91. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the Foley test.9 2
Justice Stevens parsed the statute and limited his search
for the requisite clear congressional intent to the specific sec-
tion, indeed the very subsection in question. Finding the only
geographic reference in his limited field of inquiry to be "affect-
ed states" in the "critical habitat" clause of the section, Justice
Stevens indicated that he was unable to find clear congressio-
nal intent that section 7 be applied extraterritorially. As a
result, Justice Stevens concluded that under the Foley Doc-
trine, international scope of ESA could not be justified.93
The Eighth Circuit and Justice Stevens, in interpreting
the same statutory language, arrived at completely polar re-
sults. If nothing else, the contrast between the Eighth Circuit's
and Justice Stevens's analyses leads to the inescapable conclu-
sion that the Foley Doctrine does not provide a realistic line of
demarcation for the courts and raises the question as to the
need or viability of Foley at all.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
An analysis of Foley and its application is best understood
in the context of the evolution of the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality, the development of the doctrine and the selec-
tive manner in which it has been applied. What was once a
strict rule barring the extraterritorial reach of United States
laws has today evolved into a rebuttable presumption, purport-
edly intended as a guide to discovering legislative intent, but is
so readily subject to a contrary interpretation of the same
"facts" as to provide little guidance at all.
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Internation-
al Law
The concept of extraterritoriality relates to the jurisdic-
tional operation of a sovereign's laws upon "persons, rights, or
jural relations" 94 outside the territorial borders of a sovereign
state.9" In order for a statute to apply extraterritorially, two
basic criteria must be satisfied. First, the legislative body or
92. Id
93. 1&
94. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990).
95. Id.
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institution must possess the authority to regulate conduct
outside its territorial borders.96 Second, this jurisdictional
power must in fact have been exercised.9"
In the United States, long standing principles of law af-
firm Congress's authority to proscribe conduct outside this
country's borders.9" Many commercial and criminal federal
statutes regulating antitrust, securities, taxation, trademarks,
and criminal behavior have been given extraterritorial ef-
fect.99 When the courts are confronted with a dispute regard-
ing the extraterritorial scope of a congressional enactment the
question is whether Congress actually intended the statute in
question to be applicable to activities in foreign countries, not
whether Congress has the power to do so.00
Superimposed over the United States' broad assertion of
legislative power are principles of international law which
recognize only five situations in which a country has "jurisdic-
tion to prescribe"'0 ' laws extraterritorially.0 2 They are: (1)
the territorial principle, under which a state can exercise juris-
diction over actions in its own territory; (2) the nationality
96. Joan R. Goldfarb, Note, Extraterritorial Compliance with NEPA Amid the
Current Wave of Environmental Alarm, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 543 (1991)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1987)).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690 (1962) (The Sherman Antitrust Act is applicable to conspiracies to monopolize
or restrain domestic or foreign commerce, even if the acts complained of occur
outside the United States borders.); Steele v. Bulova Watch, 344 U.S. 280 (1952)
(applying the Lanham Trademark Act to trademark infringements committed by a
United States citizen acting in Mexico); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,
437 (1932) ("questions of application of acts of Congress to citizens of United
States in foreign countries is one of construction, not legislative power."); United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922) ("The United States as a sovereign may
regulate ships under its flag and the conduct of its citizens while on those
ships."); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977) (Congress has the
authority to control the taking of marine mammals by a United States citizen in
the territorial waters of another country, but it did not intend to do this by pass-
ing the Marine Mammals Protection Act of 1972.).
99. See cases cited supra note 98.
100. See cases cited supra note 98.
101. "Jurisdiction to prescribe refers to a state's authority to make its law
applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interest of per-
sons in things." JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, EXTRATERRITORIAL EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS
OF THE UNITED STATES; THE REGULATION OF THE OVERSEAS WORKPLACE 160
(1992); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401(a) (1987).
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 introductory note
(1987).
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principle, under which a state can exercise jurisdiction over its
nationals; (3) the objective territorial principle, under which a
state can exercise jurisdiction over conduct taking place out-
side its territory that has a substantial effect within its territo-
ry; (4) the protective principle, under which a state has an
interest in protecting itself against acts outside its territory
that threaten the state; and, (5) the universal principle, under
which the state has jurisdiction over universally condemned
activities.
10 3
Even if a state possesses jurisdiction under one or more of
these recognized principles to extend its laws extraterritorially,
it is generally recognized that a state may not regulate foreign
activities without limitation. According to the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law, °4 a country may only
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law when the assertion of
such jurisdiction is reasonable. The reasonableness of a state's
interest is usually judged by the "relation of the transaction,
occurrence or event, and of the person to be affected to the
state's proper concerns."0 5 This jurisdictional rule of reason
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(2) (1987). See also
R.Y. Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and The United States Antitrust Laws,
1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1957); Goldfarb, supra note 96; ZIMMERMAN, supra
note 101, at 160.
Many modern scholars also recognize a sixth principle. Under the passive
personality principle a state can extend its jurisdiction over any activity that caus-
es an injury to a state's national. Jennings, supra at 154.
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1987).
105. To determine the reasonableness of a State's jurisdiction, section 403 of
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law suggests an evaluation of "all the
relevant factors, including, where appropriate:"
(a) the link of activity to the territory of the regulating state ...
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
() the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
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reflects the basic understanding that each individual country
must account for, and not unnecessarily impinge upon, the
interests properly controlled by the other members of the world
community.' °
These international legal precepts originally formed the
basis of the presumption against extraterritoriality embodied
in the Foley Doctrine. Recognizing that legislating in a manner
which affects activities in another sovereign's territory raises
the possibility of conflict between the United States and the
affected sovereign, the canon leaves to Congress important
policy decisions in which the danger of international discord is
clear and substantial.0 7 Congress, not the judiciary, possess-
es the power to create laws that conflict with either the law of
nations or another sovereign's jurisdiction, and the judiciary
should uphold these pbtentially volatile policy determinations
only when Congress expressly communicates its intent.08
Neither side in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife°9 ques-
tioned the right of Congress to legislate extraterritorially had
it chosen to. The sole issue was whether it intended to do so.
Nor was there any question raised about whether a restriction
imposed upon an agency was appropriate. Well before this case
arose, the nationality principle had been held to include both
individuals"0 and corporations"' and it would be illogical
the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two
states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as
well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all
the relevant factors, Subsection (2) a state should defer to the other state
if that state's interest is clearly greater.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 403(2)-403(3) (1987).
106. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 825 (2d
ed. 1987).
107. See Benz v. Compania Naveria Hidalgo S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1957);
see also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); ZIMMERMAN, supra note
101, at 111.
108. Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979
Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308, 1312 (1983). To
illustrate how the extraterritorial extension of United States jurisdiction may re-
sult in international discord see for example the European Community's and
Japan's reactions to President Reagan's 1982 imposition of sanctions against the
USSR pursuant to section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 2401-20 (Supp. III. 1979). Id
109. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
110. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6) (To assert a claim
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to exclude the government's own agencies from the jurisdic-
tional reach of United States law."' In addition, given the
fact that the final determination of whether an agency will
fund a project, wherever it is located, usually occurs at the
agency's "home" office within the United States,"' there is
little question under either the nationality or territorial princi-
ples of jurisdiction that Congress possesses the power to con-
trol any agency's extraterritorial activity under the ESA. The
critical question is whether the legislature intended that the
legislation apply internationally, and it is here that the pre-
sumption and its application play a critical role.
B. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality and United
States Law
Since the early 1900s, United States courts have been
confronted with the issue of whether an act of Congress should
apply to persons and activities occurring in foreign jurisdic-
tions."' During the first half of the twentieth century, the
United States judiciary developed and applied a general rule of
statutory construction that strictly limited the scope of con-
gressional enactments to the territorial borders of the United
States."5 However, as evolution in the world's economic and
social fabric caused an increase in the number of transnational
conflicts, the courts slowly began to broaden their interpreta-
tion of the jurisdictional scope of congressional enact-
ments."6
on behalf of an individual a state must prove that a genuine connection exists
between it and the individual.); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS §
402(2) (1987); see also McDougall, supra note 18, at 445.
111. Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co., (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
5) (A corporation is considered a national of the state where it is incorporated.);
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 213 (1987); see also McDougall,
supra note 18, at 445.
112. McDougall, supra note 18, at 445.
113. See McDougall, supra note 18.
114. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (In the
Supreme Court's first decision defining the extraterritorial scope of a United States
statute, the Court refused to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to monopolistic
activities in Costa Rica); see also Turley, "When In Rome," supra note 5, at 600.
115. Turley, "When in Rome," supra note 5; see, e.g., United States v. Twenty-
Five Packages of Panama Hats, 231 U.S. 358, 362 (1913) (While it was possible to
bring a proceeding against a res physically present in the United States, it was
impossible to assert criminal jurisdiction extraterritorially.).
116. See Turley, "When In Rome," supra note 5, at 656-58.
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Despite recognition of the need to look to world implica-
tions of legislation, the judiciary remained reluctant and re-
tained the presumption that, unless a contrary intent was
expressed, the courts should assume that extraterritorial appli-
cation of a United States statute was not intended. If Congress
wanted a law applied extraterritorially, the courts required
precise language to that effect. 117 Not surprisingly, excep-
tions into this fairly straightforward proposition soon emerged.
A watershed case in the evolving entry of the courts into areas
in which Congress was silent as to its intent, was United
States v. Bowman."8 The Bowman decision is significant be-
cause it not only put to rest any question of Congress's right to
proscribe extraterritorial behavior, it found such a right, de-
spite a total absence of extraterritorial language in the statute
in question."9
In Bowman, employees of a shipping company in which
the United States was the sole stockholder conspired, while on
the high seas and in Brazil, to overcharge the United States
government for a shipment of oil. 2 ' At trial the district court
refused to find any wrongdoing because the law did not include
express congressional authorization to redress acts committed
abroad. The district court believed itself powerless to implicitly
extend a statute to overseas activities.' 21 On appeal, after ex-
amining both the nature of the crime and the traditional juris-
dictional limitations placed upon governmental power by the
law of nations, the Supreme Court held that section 35 of the
Criminal Code was designed to punish United States citizens
who attempted to defraud the United States government, even
if no overt act took place within the borders of the United
States.122
In reversing the district court's decision, the Supreme
Court found the requisite congressional intent by implication,
117. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (Because Congress ex-
pressly indicated its desire to permit the service of process on United States citi-
zens residing outside the country, the Court had no choice but to uphold the ex-
traterritorial service of process.); see also Turley, "When In Rome," supra note 5.
118. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
119. Id The statute in question was section 35 of the Criminal Code, as
amended October 23, 1918, (40 Stat. 1015 [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919 § 10199]).
120. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 95.
121. Id. at 97.
122. Id. at 98.
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finding that a contrary ruling would undermine the Act's effec-
tiveness by creating a jurisdictional loophole though which
wrongdoers could easily avoid prosecution by simply commit-
ting the proscribed activity outside the territorial borders of
the United States.2 ' The Court reasoned that "in such cases
Congress has not deemed it necessary to make specific provi-
sions in the law.., but allows it to be inferred from the na-
ture of the offense." 124 Thus, after Bowman the express lan-
guage requirement no longer was absolute, although the Court
made it clear that in contrast to laws designed to protect the
government, those statutes which were designed to "affect the
peace and good order of the community" 125 were local in na-
ture and therefore would be presumed to apply only within the
territory of the United States, unless Congress expressly, states
otherwise.
26
After Bowman, courts continued, albeit tentatively, to
mold and develop the concept of extraterritoriality, often in the
face of Congress's lack of explicit authorization. 27 Although
the Bowman decision indicated the judiciary's willingness to
break with the traditionally strict bar against applying stat-
utes to activities abroad, the Court failed to specify a clear
rationale which would guide the resolution of subsequent dis-
putes involving the extraterritorial reach of ambiguously word-
ed statutes. During the post-Bowman era, courts were left
without a consistent approach for ascertaining unexpressed
congressional intent. Finally, in 1949, the Supreme Court
seemed to provide a viable approach by adopting a canon of
construction in the landmark decision of Foley Bros. v.
Filardo.'28
The issue in Foley centered on the question of whether the
"Federal Eight Hour Law" '29 applied to a construction con-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The list included assault, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson,
embezzlement, and fraud as examples of the type of crime that affects "the peace
and good order of the community." Id.
126. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 117.
127. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); see also Turley,
"When In Rome," supra note -5.
128. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
129. 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-26 (1988). The pertinent portion of the act, quoted in the
opinion, provided that
Every contract made to which the United States . . . is a party . ..
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tract between the United States and a private contractor for
work performed by the contractor in the Middle East.130 The
plaintiff, an American citizen, was hired as a cook on a con-
struction project in Iran and Iraq, a job that frequently re-
quired him to work well in excess of eight hours per day. Un-
able to persuade his employer to comply with the "time and a
half' overtime provisions contained in the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, the plaintiff initiated suit.13' At trial, the district
court held that the "time and a half' regulation applied to the
contract in question."2 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed. 13 3 However, after granting certiorari, the
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that neither the language,
the scheme, the legislative history, nor the administrative
interpretations of the statute provided any "touchstones by
which [the Act's] geographic scope [could] be determined."'34
The Court, while recognizing that Congress possessed the
power to extend the scope of the Federal Eight Hour Law to
activities in foreign countries, declined to find such an intent
implicit in the statute at hand. The Court announced that "the
canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Con-
gress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is a
valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may
be ascertained."'35 The Court reasoned that "Congress is pri-
marily concerned with domestic conditions,"'36 and therefore
silence by Congress raises the presumption that it did not
intend international application. The need for international
"touchstones" raised again, albeit in slightly different wording,
the pre-Bowman "express language" requisite. At a minimum,
shall contain a provision that no laborer of mechanic doing any part of
the work contemplated by the contract, in the employ of the contractor or
any subcontractor . . . shall be required or permitted to work more than
eight hours in any one calendar day . ...
Id. If a worker labored for more than eight hours the employer was required to
provide compensation at a rate of no less than one and one-half times the basic
rate of pay. Id.
130. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
131. Id.
132. Id
133. Id
134. Id. at 288.
135. Id- at 285.
136. Id
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the court in Foley dictated that Bowman type exceptions were
to be rare.
131
Thus, the presumption against extraterritoriality is sup-
posedly the standard upon which all disputes regarding the
geographic scope of ambiguously worded statutes are mea-
sured.13 As Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife"9 demonstrates, the Foley review pro-
cess has, at least to some jurists, ultimately come to be a
search for express language. Over the years, however, a selec-
tive and disturbing pattern has emerged with regard to when
the doctrine is used, and when used, how it has been applied.
Courts have, with little exception, utilized the presumption
against extraterritoriality to exclude the international applica-
tion of statutes relating to so-called social issues, 40 but dur-
ing that same period the Foley Doctrine has not created simi-
lar barriers to statutes designed to regulate economic activ-
ities.' This dictum, and the lack of logical rationale under-
lying it, can be illustrated by analyzing the extraterritorial
application of environmental statutes on one hand, and
trademark statutes on the other, contrasting the reasoning
courts have applied in finding there to be no extraterritorial
application in the former, and extraterritoriality in the latter.
V. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND IN TRADE-
MARK LEGISLATION CASES
The judicial attitude on the issue of extraterritoriality in
trademark cases does much to highlight the illogic of the dis-
criminating application of the Foley Doctrine. From a strictly
technical perspective it can be argued that trademark laws are
commercial statutes. They assure that the goodwill associated
with a word or symbol in respect to a product or service is the
goodwill and property of the first user.' With exclusive priv-
137. Id.
138. See Turley, "When in Rome," supra note 5 at 602.
139. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
140. See supra text accompanying note 5.
141. See supra text accompanying note 6.
142. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)
(The purpose behind trademark protection is to secure for the owner the "goodwill
of his business . . . "). See also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 412 (1916) ("The redress that is accorded in trademark cases is based upon a
parties right to be protected in the goodwill of a trade or business."); Yale Elec.
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ilege over the use of the particular word or symbol," the
owner is empowered to stop second comers from infringing on
his or her property rights. However, in a broader sense, trade-
mark laws are also social legislation with social implications in
protecting the innocent public from being deceived by improper
and mistaken association between goods and services and their
alleged supplier.' When viewed in this latter context there
are surprising parallels between environmental and trademark
regulations. Each has ramifications extending beyond the
rights of the named parties to any action. While "the essential
element of a trademark is the exclusive right of its owner to
use a word or device to distinguish his product,"'45 a basic
policy justification for granting such an exclusive commercial
right is the public's interest in not being deceived.'46 Similar-
ly, most environmental regulations are predicated upon the un-
derlying assumption that improving the environment will en-
hance the quality of all human life.'47 The resolution of ei-
Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (A person's trademark "is his
authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name
for good or ill.").
143. A trademark is defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device or any
combination thereof ... (1) used by a person ... to identify and distinguish his
or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by
others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if the source is unknown." 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
144. Section 32 of the Lanham Act protects against any unauthorized action
that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1)(a) (1988). See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) ("A trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induc-
es a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been lead to believe he
wants."); Stahly, Inc. v. M.H. Jacobs Co., 183 F.2d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1950) ("It
must be remembered that the trademark laws and the law of unfair competition
are concerned not only with the protection of a property right existing in the
individual, but also with the protection of the public from fraud and deceit and it
is obvious that the right of the public to be so protected is a right which tran-
scends the rights of the individual trademark owner and is beyond his power to
waive."); see also Robert J. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First
Amendment Analysis, 77 Trademark Rep. 177 (1987); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (1973).
145. MCCARTHY, supra note 144, at 45, § 2:2 (quoting Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jac-
queline Cochran, Inc. 312 F.2d 125 (1962)).
146. MCCARTHY, supra note 144, at 43.
147. See infra note 169 (describing the policies- underlying the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969); see also Knickerbocker, supra note 20, at 8 ("There
is no doubt that over time the quality of human life declines as the quality of
natural ecosystems declines.").
"Over half of all prescription drugs in the United States, for example, de-
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ther an environmental or a trademark dispute must ultimately
account for the unrepresented public whose rights are inexo-
rably linked to the rights of the litigating parties.
The guiding United States policies underlying the concepts
of property rights and economic free enterprise also find a
common root in environmental and trademark regulation. Any
governmental action that either limits the use of property or
grants an exclusive right to an individual or corporation must
be balanced against the deeply entrenched economic policy to
encourage free competition within the marketplace. Any bene-
fits derived from regulating the use of property must outweigh
the harm caused by the disruption of the free market. In for-
mulating environmental or trademark legislation, Congress
balances the potential disruptive effects of the regulations
against their potential benefits.
Despite the obvious parallels between environmental and
trademark statutes at the legislative stage, the picture is quite
different when the judiciary is called upon to interpret the
legislation-particularly with regard to issues involving extra-
territoriality.
A Extraterritoriality and Environmental Legislation
Environmental legislation has rarely been granted extra-
territorial application, 4 ' generally on the basis of the Foley
Doctrine. 49 The judiciary's rigid application of the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality has created a jurisdictional
prison confining the geographic scope of environmental regula-
tions to activities occurring within the United States. 5 ° A
typical example is the 1977 decision in United States v. Mitch-
ell.151
In Mitchell the Fifth Circuit refused to impose criminal
rive from wild plant and animal species." Knickerbocker, supra note 20, at 8.
148. Indeed, it is only in a recent decision by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia that the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) was found applicable to activities of a federal agency incinerating food
wastes in Antartica, but only after finding that Antartica was, in law, not a for-
eign country but rather a continent akin in law to outer space, a sovereignless
region. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 529 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
149. Turley, 'When In Rome," supra note 5, at 607.
150. Turley, "When In Rome," supra note 5, at 607-08.
151. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
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sanctions on a United States citizen who had allegedly violated
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)152 by capturing
dolphins in the territorial waters of the Commonwealth of the
Bahamas. 5 ' Passed in 1972, the MMPA established, subject
to specified exceptions, a moratorium on the taking, importing
and selling of any marine mammal.'54 The defendant, a Unit-
ed States citizen, had obtained permission from the Bahamian
government to capture a number of Atlantic Bottlenose Dol-
phins for exportation to Great Britain. 5 5 The defendant was
indicted in the'Southern District of Florida and charged with
violating the MMPA, which makes it "unlawful for any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ... to take any
marine mammals on the high seas.' 56 In overturning the
defendant's conviction, and despite the reference to the "high
seas," which are perforce outside the territory of the United
States, the Fifth Circuit held that neither the Act nor its legis-
lative history "demonstrate the clear intent required by Bow-
man and its progeny to overcome the presumption against
extraterritorial extension of [United States] statutes."57
To reach this conclusion the Fifth Circuit subjected the
MMPA to a two-part analysis. Citing United States v. Bow-
man,"' the Mitchell court reached the very opposite conclu-
sion of the Bowman Court.'59 The court "characterized" con-
servation statutes, like MMPA, as being inherently domestic
because such laws derive their "nature" on a territorial ba-
sis-from the absolute control every sovereign has over its
natural resources. 60 Thus, the court reasoned that each in-
152. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
153. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
154. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a).
155. Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 997.
156. Id. at 1000 (quoting Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1372(a)(1) (1988)).
157. Id, at 1004.
158. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
159. Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 1002. However, the court did not note that Bowman
might well have served as a basis to affirm the conviction. A crime was committed
outside the United States in direct contravention of a United States law. Surely
the decision in Bowman would not have been different if the Brazilian government
conspired with the defendants to cheat the United States government. Id.
160. Id. The Fifth Circuit cited the United Nations resolution on "Permanent
Sovereignty over National Resources" G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR 17th Sess.,
1194th plen. mtg. at 107-08 (1962), and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art. 14, as supporting this proposition; see gen-
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dependent state in the world community is entitled to pre-
serve, exploit, or draw a balance between preservation or ex-
ploitation of the resources within their territory as they deem
fit. 6' Unlike the acts prohibited by the Criminal Code in
Bowman,62 the court found that the criminal acts proscribed
in Mitchell were confined to the geographic locus of the United
States and that such a limitation would not diminish from the
Act's total effectiveness or create a safe haven where those
intent on breaking the law could find shelter from prosecu-
tion. 63
If there was any doubt that conservation statutes were
going to be given special restrictive extraterritorial treatment,
four years later another federal appeals court went even fur-
ther than Mitchell and read Foley as requiring "an unequivocal
mandate" in cases of environmental legislation. 64 The stat-
ute in issue was the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA).165
Like the ESA, the legislation at issue in Defenders of Wild-
life v. Lujan,66 NEPA imposes procedural obligations which
require all federal agencies to take a "hard look" at the poten-
tial environmental consequences of their actions. 67 To en-
sure that NEPA's far reaching environmental policies 168 are
erally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 601-604 (1987).
161. Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 1002.
162. See supra text accompanying note 125.
163. Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 1002.
164. See Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988). See Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F.
Supp. 749, (D. .Haw. 1990); Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
166. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
167. Robertson v. Methow, 490 U.S. 332, 333 (1989); Sabine River Auth. v.
Texas Conservation Assoc., 951 F.2d 669, 676 (5th Cir. 1992).
168. The basic goals of the NEPA are specifically set forth in the Act's declara-
tion of purpose, which states:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his envi-
yonment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare to
man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural
resources important to the Nation; and establish a Council on Environ-
mental Quality.
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
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implemented, Congress incorporated "action forcing" ' proce-
dures into the statute. Drafted in broad, all-inclusive language,
NEPA mandates that "all agencies of the Federal Government
shall... include in every recommendation or report on propos-
als for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement... on the environmental impact of the proposed
action."70 The federal government sparked considerable con-
troversy when it failed to apply the Act and prepare an envi-
ronmental impact statement (EIS) for agency action occurring
in foreign jurisdictions.' 7 ' All challenges but one 72 have
fallen under the weight of the Foley Doctrine.
That one exception is the case of Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Massey,.73 decided in 1993 by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia. In Massey the failure to
seek an EIS was held violative of NEPA, even though the ac-
tivity occurred outside the borders of the United States. Unlike
most extraterritorial decisions, the alleged action, the open air
burning of food wastes, was not undertaken in another
sovereign's territory, but in Antarctica, a continent which the
court indicated to be the legal equivalent of outer space. How-
ever, where the foreign jurisdiction has been another sover-
eignty, NEPA has not been applied extraterritorially.
For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission' 4 (NRDC), the Commission,
without preparing a site-specific EIS, approved Westinghouse
Electric Corporation's application for a license to export a nu-
clear reactor and nuclear materials to the Philippines. 75 The
169. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(i) (1988).
171. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990); National Org. for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws v. United States Dep't of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226
(D.D.C. 1975); Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645 (D.
Haw. 1973). See also Turley, 'When In Rome", supra note 5; Goldfarb, supra note
96.
172. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
173. Id.
174. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
175. Id.
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Commission defended its decision to forego the preparation of
an EIS on two grounds. First, the Commission interpreted
NEPA as only mandating the preparation of an EIS when
agency action affects the territory within the United
States.'76 Second, the Commission argued that basic princi-
ples of comity and international sovereignty prevented it from
insisting upon an exploratory visit to the reactor site within
the Philippines. 7 '
In sustaining the Commission's position, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed
NEPA's geographic scope under an analysis which character-
ized Foley as not merely a presumption, but rather as a gener-
al "rule against extraterritoriality"' v which could only be
overcome by "an unequivocal mandate from Congress."'7 9
Evaluating NEPA's geographic scope under these "anti-extra-
territorial policy"'8° considerations the D.C. Circuit held that
"NEPA does not apply to [Commission] nuclear export licens-
ing decisions."'
This literal and formalistic utilization of the presumption
against extraterritoriality continues today as the basis upon
which most courts determine the geographic reach of environ-
mental statutes. In Greenpeace USA v. Stone,'82 environmen-
tal groups unsuccessfully challenged the army's decision to
forego the preparation of an EIS prior to transporting obsolete
chemical munitions'83 from their storage site in the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) to a disposal facility at the
Johnston Atoll."8 The United States Army, acting in concert
176. Id. at 1348.
177. Id. at 1353. Considerable controversy surrounded the selected location of
the reactor. 'The Napot Point is about twelve miles from the Subic Bay Naval
Base and forty miles from Clark Air Force Base where a total of 32,000 American
armed service members are stationed." Id. at 1351. The concern for the military
personnel stationed in such close proximity to a nuclear reactor was intensified by
the fact that the selected area was known to be seismically active. Id.
178. Id. at 1365.
179. Id. at 1357. See also Turley, "When in Rome", supra note 5.
180. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Massey, 647 F.2d 1345, 1366 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
181. Id.
182. 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990).
183. Approximately 100,000 rounds of nerve gas had been stockpiled in
Clausan, Germany since 1968. Id.
184. Id. at 752. Located in the central Pacific Ocean approximately 800 miles
southwest of Honolulu, Hawaii, Johnston Atoll is an unincorporated United States
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with West Germany's Army, planned the removal to comply
with an executive agreement entered into by the United States
and the FRG, which mandated the complete elimination of the
chemical stockpile by the end of 1990.185 Refusing to apply
NEPA to the removal protocol, the district court noted that
although the Act's language clearly demonstrates a concern for
the "global environment,"'86 Congress failed to explicitly indi-
cate its desire to apply the statute to agency activity in foreign
countries."' Without a clearly expressed authorization the
court feared that extending NEPA's geographic scope would re-
sult in "grave foreign policy" repercussions.
8 8
While NRDC and Greenpeace USA did not extend the
jurisdictional reach of NEPA beyond the territorial borders of
the United States, both courts gave lip service to the require-
ment that they give a case by case analysis in the future' 89
and expressly limited their opinions to the facts. However, the
impression that under different circumstances NEPA might be
applied to agency conduct abroad has (with the exception of
Antarctica) proven illusory.
The decisions since the Supreme Court's original attempt
in Foley to define "a valid approach whereby unexpressed con-
gressional intent may be ascertained,"9 ° have been supplant-
ed by an almost insurmountable policy against extraterritorial-
ity even in statutes replete with extraterritorial wording and
implications. Instead of scrutinizing a statute to ascertain
Congress's true intent, courts focus their analysis on seeking
an "unequivocal"' 9' or explicit 192 statement that Congress
territory which has been used for various military purposes since World War II.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 759.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 761.
189. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.,
647 F.2d 1345, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("I find only that NEPA does not apply to
NRC nuclear export licensing decisions and not necessarily that EIS requirement
is inapplicable to some other kind of major federal action abroad."); Greenpeace
USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 761 (D. Haw. 1990) ("In other circumstances
NEPA may require a federal agency to prepare an EIS for action taken
abroad . . . -).
190. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
191. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
647 F.2d 1345, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
192. Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F.Supp. 749, 759 (D. Haw. 1990).
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intended the act, or indeed the specific provision, to apply to
actions in foreign territories. Even if this approach had been
applied evenhandedly, it would be subject to criticism. More-
over, this type of strict interpretation is all the more disturbing
in light of the strikingly more liberal approach utilized by
courts to decide the extraterritorial scope of "ambiguous" eco-
nomic based statutes, even those clearly linked with social
interest, such as The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham
Act).193
B. Extraterritoriality and the Lanham Act
Three years after its Foley pronouncement, the Supreme
Court interpreted the extraterritorial scope of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946.'9' Unlike the restrictive and formal-
istic approach applied in environmental cases, a majority of
the Court examined the statute as a whole to determine the
extraterritorial intent of Congress where a trademark regis-
tered in the United States was being infringed by activities
based in Mexico by a citizen and resident of the United
States.
95
In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., the Bulova Watch Com-
pany sought to enjoin the defendant, a United States citizen
who owned a watch manufacturing company headquartered in
Mexico City, from stamping the plaintiffs registered mark of
BULOVA on watches produced with parts bought from the
United States and Switzerland, but assembled and sold in
Mexico.'97 While none of the defendant's spurious watches
were sold within the United States, the Bulova Watch Compa-
ny initiated the suit in response to numerous reports by jewel-
ers located in United States border towns that their customers
were regularly brining the defendant's defective watches in for
repair.' 9 The defendant answered Bulova's complaint by ar-
guing that Congress did not intend the jurisdictional scope of
the Lanham Act to extend to his extraterritorial activities. 199
193. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
194. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id
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Although the Lanham Act lacked express extraterritorial
language, the Supreme Court did not look for an unequivocal
mandate or explicit language by Congress. Rather, the Court
implicitly found congressional intent in the Act's broad asser-
tion of jurisdictional power.2°° In upholding Congress's power
to regulate unfair trade practices committed by United States
nationals in foreign countries, the Court stressed that "the
United States is not debarred by any rule of international law
from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high
seas or in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or
their nationals are not infringed."20 Undoubtedly cognizant
of the fact that it was implicitly interfering with a business
conducted under Mexican law, the Court mentioned that sub-
sequent to its granting of certiorari, the Supreme Court of
Mexico, in a separate action, nullified the defendant's regis-
tration of the BULOVA mark in Mexico.2" 2 Thus, the United
States Supreme Court held that, extending the Act's geo-
graphic scope would not conflict with Mexican law.20 3
The Court found it significant that the defendant's "opera-
tions and their effects were not confined within the territorial
limits of a foreign nation."20 4 Not only did the defendant pur-
chase materials from the United States, but the infiltration of
his imitation BULOVAs into the United States market ad-
versely reflected upon the Bulova Watch Company's carefully
200. Id at 285 ("In light of the broad jurisdictional grant in the Lanham Act,
we deem its scope to encompass petitioner's activities here.").
The Court found that the statute's expressed intent was to regulate com-
merce within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive
and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered
marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial
legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair
competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use
of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered
marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and
conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition
entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
Id. at 283 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). The Act defines commerce as "all
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
201. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952).
202. Id
203. Id This part of the Court's analysis is somewhat peculiar in that the
nullification of the defendant's Mexican registration did not necessarily mean he
could not trade in BULOVA brand watches.
204. Id. at 286.
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cultivated trade reputation." 5 While recognizing that the
defendant's acts when viewed in isolation did not violate Unit-
ed States law, the Court noted that "acts in themselves legal
lose that character when they become part of an unlawful
scheme."" 6 Therefore, the Court refused to allow the defen-
dant to "evade the thrust of the laws of the United States"0 '
by hiding "in a privileged sanctuary beyond our borders."0 '
Not every Justice supported the majority's interpretation
of the geographic scope of the Lanham Act. In his dissent,
Justice Reed, with whom Justice Douglas joined, argued that
the "Lanham Act... should be construed to apply only to acts
done within the sovereignty of the United States."2 9 The dis-
senters recognized that the majority opinion was predicating
its decision on what can at best be described as a very general-
ized statement of legislative intent. Indeed, the dissent con-
tended that Congress's intent to apply the Act to extraterritori-
al activities should not be based upon some generalized terms
contained within the statute.210 They asserted that in inter-
preting the geographic scope of an ambiguous statute, courts
should apply "words having universal scope... to mean only
everyone subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator
subsequently may be able to catch."21" ' Thus, according to
these justices, "commerce," which the Act broadly defined as
"all commerce which may be lawfully regulated by Con-
,,212 -1 nogress, could not be read as extending the scope of the
Lanham Act to activities consummated in foreign coun-
tries.1 3 Yet despite all these interpretive issues, Foley was
not applied and extraterritoriality was found to exist.
Even the dissenters' attempt to distinguish the "nature" of
the Lanham Act from the "nature" of the Criminal Code inter-
preted in Bowman214 could not convince their fellow justic-
es.21" The dissenters' plea for a strict textual approach to the
205. Id.
206. Id. at 287.
207. Id-
208. Id.
209. Id. at 292.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 290.
212. Id. at 290 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988)).
213. Id.
214. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
215. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 291 (1952).
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interpretation of the extraterritorial reach of broadly worded
statutes failed to inspire a change in the majority's expansive
view, despite the fact that the defendant did not engage in any
illegal commercial acts.216 The defendant's purchasing of
parts from the United States, his stamping of the mark
BULOVA in Mexico, and the bringing by the consumer, with-
out the defendant's knowledge or prompting, of the watches
into the United States, could not be viewed as illegal acts
"within the control of Congress" as specified in the Lanham
Act.217
Subsequent to Bulova Watch, the Second Circuit restated
the Supreme Court's analysis as a three-part test.28 For a
court to apply the Lanham Act extraterritorially, the evidence
must indicate that: (1) the complained of conduct has a sub-
stantial effect on the United States commerce; (2) the defen-
dant is a United States citizen; and, (3) no conflicts exist with
the defendant's trademark rights established under foreign
law.21 '9 Although not in itself an insubstantial test, it is far
less severe than Foley and lends itself to a case by case analy-
sis. Thus, the Second Circuit refused to impose Lanham Act
penalties against a Canadian citizen who used the plaintiffs
United States registered trademark, under color of Canadian
law, even though the defendants' acts had a substantial effect
on commerce within the United States.22 °
216. Id.
217. Id. at 291-92. Indeed the dissenters would likely have been satisfied with
an analysis at least as thorough as the Eighth Circuit's in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, but in the circumstances the majority obviously felt even that level of
analysis was not needed.
218. See Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton & Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
219. Id. at 642.
220. Id. at 643. See also C-Cure Chem. Co. v. Secure Adhesives Corp., 571 F.
Supp. 808, 821 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The clear import of Vanity Fair Mills is that the
Lanham Act should not be applied to a foreign citizen allegedly committing in-
fringing acts in his or her home country.").
Subsequent Second Circuit cases indicate that the absence of a strict com-
pliance with each prong of the three part test is not necessarily fatal and may not
preclude the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act. For example, in Calvin
Klein Indus., Inc. v. BFK H.K., Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the district
court enjoined activities occurring outside the United States, even though the de-
fendant was not a United States citizen. The court reasoned that because the
defendant resided in New York and directly controlled a New York corporation,
the defendant could be treated as a United States citizen and therefore subject to
United States' unfair competition regulations. Therefore, in the absence of conflict
with foreign trademark laws the constructive citizenship of the defendant distin-
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Unlike Foley, the Bulova test is not insurmountable. Using
the Bulova Watch/Second Circuit analysis, the Fifth Circuit in
American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative
Assoc.,221 held that the Lanham Act applied to a United
States merchant who affixed an infringing mark on goods in
the United States, but sold the goods only in a foreign coun-
try.2
22
In American Rice Growers, the defendant and the plaintiff
were farmers cooperatives fiercely competing for a share of the
rice market in Saudi Arabia.223 The defendant, in an attempt
to break into the plaintiffs seventy-three percent share of the
market, packaged its rice in containers confusingly similar to
that used by the plaintiffs, and employed a confusingly similar
trademark on the containers.224 In affirming the district
court's grant of an injunction against further sales to the Saudi
Arabian market, the Fifth Circuit utilized the three prong
Second Circuit analysis225 and found that the actions of the
defendant, a United States corporation based in Arkansas,
significantly affected the commerce of the United States by
diverting sales away from the plaintiffs well established
brand.226 Citing Bulova Watch, the court reasoned that so
long as the defendant's actions adversely affected commerce
within the United States, the fact that the customer confusion
occurred on foreign soil to non-United States citizens was in-
consequential.227 The court found that its decision did not
conflict with Saudi law absent a Saudi judicial declaration of
the rights of the parties.2
The expansive approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in de-
ciding the extraterritorial issues in American Rice Growers is
but another illustration of the sharp contrast between the
guishes the case from Vanity Fair Mills. See also A.T. Cross Co. v. Sunil Trading
Corp., 467 F. Supp. 47, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("Despite the fact that [the defendant]
is not a United States citizen, he was in all respects acting in his capacity as an
officer of a New York corporation when engaged in the purchase and sale of coun-
terfeit pens.").
221. 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id-
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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judiciary's review of extraterritoriality in respect to commercial
legislation and its restrictive Foley view when examining the
same issue in the context of social action legislation.
VI. EXTRATERRITORIALITY: A UNIFIED APPROACH
The Supreme Court's failure to address the extraterritorial
issue in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife229 leaves the question
of the geographic scope of the ESA unresolved. Since authori-
zation for the Act expired on October 1, 1992, 230 the extrater-
ritorial issue may or may not be settled by a congressional
amendment specifically defining the Act's jurisdictional obliga-
tions.2 1' Regardless of how or if the issue is legislatively re-
solved, the overriding Foley issue will not be clarified unless
the judiciary's inconsistent application of this canon of statuto-
ry construction is confronted and resolved.
As originally intended, the Foley Doctrine's presumption
against extraterritoriality was designed to assist courts in
ascertaining unexpressed congressional intent.232 Whatever
clarity the doctrine was originally intended to provide has long
been mooted, as the different results reached by the Eighth
Circuit and Justice Stevens clearly illustrate. Moreover, the
selective application of the doctrine depending upon the nature
of the legislation raises questions of fairness. Unless modified,
Foley will continue to permit equally ambiguous legislation to
be interpreted in completely different ways. There is no legiti-
mate purpose that a continued existence of this dichotomy will
achieve. It is time for the courts to revisit the issue and employ
a unified rule of interpretation.
This consolidated approach need not be a newly created
one. The jurisdictional rule of reason utilized by the post-
Bulova Second and Fifth Circuits' employment of a three-
pronged balancing test is viable protocol that can be adapted to
229. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
230. Congress has only authorized spending under the ESA to extend to Octo-
ber 1, 1992. It is likely that many of the issues raised in the Lujqn v. Defenders
of Wildlife will be hotly debated at the reauthorization hearings. Endangered Spe-
cies, supra note 34, at 1, 3.
231. In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, Senator Metzenbaum of Ohio is sponsoring a bill to specifically clarify the
geographic scope of the ESA. S.74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
232. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
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other types of legislation. These criteria provide a flexible, yet
directed method of ascertaining unexpressed congressional
intent. 33
Admittedly, a rule of reason approach carries with it an
air of unpredictability, but one need only compare the Eighth
Circuit's application of Foley to that of Justice Stevens to see
that Foley does not provide certainty or consistency. Moreover,
the courts have long been able to apply a rule of reason analy-
sis instead of a per se violation standard in antitrust cas-
es.234 Decisions by courts which have previously been deemed
fair may, by examining the effect of those decisions, be called
into question. The Supreme Court has, in a recent concurring
opinion by Justice Thomas, specifically acknowledged that over
time judges can conclude that judicial interpretation of legisla-
tion can mature as we learn more about the realities of its
impact.23 5 It has been forty-four years since Foley was decid-
ed. The interdependence of the world's nations has radically in-
creased. It is time for the Supreme Court to recognize the
existence of the new world order and to alter its approach
accordingly. The Court can take a step in that direction by
revisiting and reversing the Foley Doctrine's restrictive pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality.
VII. CONCLUSION
The courts' continued disparate use of the Foley Doctrine
to ascertain whether Congress intended ambiguously worded
statutes to apply extraterritorially has resulted in a judicially
created double standard which leads to interpretive uncertain-
ty and judicial discrimination. The effect of the current appli-
cation of Foley is that social action statutes such as environ-
mental laws are subjected to a rigorous and strictly interpreted
presumption against extraterritoriality, while commercial stat-
utes typified by the Lanham Act have been subjected to a more
flexible treatment. While consistently adhering to this lopsided
approach, the courts have failed to articulate a justification for
applying different criteria depending upon the type of legisla-
233. See THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE EXTRATERROTORIAL
APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS (Dieter Lang & Gary Born eds., 1984).
234. See supra text accompanying note 6.
235. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).
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tion involved. The divergent analyses utilized by the Eighth
Circuit and Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,236 illustrates that the Foley Doctrine
neither provides predictability nor the benefit intended when it
was decided. Moreover, the legislative history of a statute such
as the ESA may be interpreted incongruently to support direct-
ly opposing conclusions. Thus, it is imperative that the judi-
ciary recognizes and rectifies its inconsistent approach to ex-
traterritoriality.
When presented with a dispute in which the international
scope of a statute is in issue, courts should ascertain
Congress's intent without any preconceived presumptions or
assumptions either for or against extraterritorial application. If
the key is legislative intent, then nothing further is needed by
way of presumption or otherwise. Each statute, regardless of
its subject matter, should be judged according to its own lan-
guage, history, and purpose. By employing an evenhanded
method of interpretation, based solely on the legislative intent,
the judiciary's goal of ascertaining Congress's true purpose in
enacting statutes will undoubtedly be more accurately effectu-
ated.
Michael J. Schwab
236. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
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